The Padre stayed and chatted with us and we gave him what information we could. He was anxious to visit the gun position but I advised him that the position was under small arms fire and that unnecessary movement was inadvisable, and that it was my opinion that the guns would withdraw soon under cover of darkness.

The carrier crew told us that four AFVs had rounded the corner at the gun position and had been hotly engaged by the guns: AP and plugged HE had gone straight through the vehicles, which were abandoned although the crews very courageously dismounted their MGs and withdrew under covering fire. Sgt Amison's gun shield had been pierced by SA fire and both he (F Troop) and Sgt Wilkinson's (sub E Troop) had been firing at a range of approx 40 yds. Lt Hooper (GPO, E Troop) had knocked out one of the AFVs by anti-tank rifle fired standing from the shoulder. We also learned of liaison with the small but gallant Commando troop who were close in front of the guns, and of 'M' Targets fired by the CPO from an OP on the gun position, but the story can better be told by the CPO himself (Capt Garland MCRA).

At about dusk approximately 1800hrs, I intercepted a DR from RHQ on his way to the gun position with orders to get the guns out if possible under cover of darkness. About an hour later the situation seemed very quiet and I dispatched the vehicles to the gun position in ones and twos. Lt Leather passed on a motorcycle on his way to RHQ to act as LO and told us more of the experiences on the gun position including air attack, hostile shelling and mortaring, sniping, AFV attack and, last but not least, shelling from our own medium battery, which had been ordered a wrong charge.

About this time men of the 456 Light Battery marched back laden with their equipment, in very good order, with morale high. They had been in position about three quarters of a mile forward of 449 Battery and had had to spike their guns under enemy infantry attack. They had fought beck with small arms and forced their way out under covering fire.

Next to appear were the CPOs and GPOs on motor cycles setting off to recce a gun position (latter called 'Sandy Ridge'). I had a brief talk with my GPO, Lt Hooper, who was somewhat bruised but elated by his experiences with the AT rifle. The night was very dark and clear. They told us that the area was astonishingly quiet after the noisy day and they thought that the guns would be able to withdraw quite easily. It appeared as though the resistance offered by the Commandos and the battery had given the enemy pause to think, probably estimating that he was faced by greater force than was in fact the case, and that he was now reorganising. It appeared that the BC and Lt Hooper with a small patrol had been responsible for recovering Major Blaxland's body and his carrier. The BC was now still with the guns and was supervising their withdrawal.

At about 2230hrs the guns arrived, and after a little reorganisation at the WL area, were led east by the BC with myself in the rear. The only stores left behind were two artillery trailers which had been bogged and difficult to extricate, but all ammunition was with the guns.

One of the first vehicles to arrive contained Bdr Coe, bren gunner of Fox troop, who handed me a bundle of papers which I could not examine in the darkness and which he said had been taken from the German AFVs. Whilst marshalling the vehicles I stopped a staff car which contained a squadron commander of the North Irish Horse who had a German prisoner. I asked him if he was going back to Brigade: when he replied that he was, I handed him the papers and asked him to deliver them to the Brigade IO, not forgetting to impress on him the importance of giving the battery credit for four AFVs.

Marshalling the vehicles was not very easy as there were quite al large number of vehicles milling about, ration trucks going up to the Lincs etc. There were still many men from the Light Battery marching back and a few stragglers from other units. We piled as many as we could on to the vehicles to lift them back, and most of the quads were carrying as many as 16 men.

We moved back to approximately one mile east of Tamera station and then halted on the road for a few moments for the guns to be guided in to the position. The night was still very dark and the only lights showing were the director beacons on the north side of the road. Reconnaissance of the position must have been extremely difficult. After ordering the vehicles a RV, I set out on a motor cycle in search of a battery waggon lines area.

NEXT PAGE: Sedjenane March 3rd 1943.